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IS THERE A GENDER BIAS IN CRIME AGAINST FIRMS FOR 
DEVELOPING ECONOMIES? 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The literature has typically found a positive relationship between crime rates and female headed 
households. Female headed households tend to indicate instability and vulnerability, and thus a 
positive relationship may not be surprising. This study explores the relationship between female 
owned firms and losses due to crime experienced by firms using data for about 12,000 firms in 
27 developing countries. Although we do find a similar positive relationship between female 
owned firms and losses due to crime, the results may suggest that the reason may be a gender 
bias in the incidence of crime. We find similar results for female owned and managed firms and 
losses due to crime. We also find that several macro-economic factors can weaken or strengthen 
the relationship between crime and female ownership and management. The results are robust to 
various sensitivity checks. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
A common theme in the crime literature is that there is a strong positive correlation between the 
proportion of female headed households and criminal activities in a geographical area. Several 
hypotheses have been suggested for this. Female headed households tend to be more unstable 
and usually face an increased risk of poverty and are thus more susceptible to crime (Kelly, 
2000). Female headed households also indicate disorientation and conflict in personal relations 
and thus are more susceptible to crime (Demombynes and Ozler, 2005). Alternate theories such 
as the possibility that female headed households are positively correlated with crime because a 
high level of crime among men lead females to avoid marriage has been refuted (Glaeser and 
Sacerdote, 1999). There are two key features this study attempts to add to the existing literature. 
First, extend the results for crime against individuals to crime against firms. Second, if female 
ownership of firms is positively correlated with crime, and there are no reasons a priori to expect 
female owned firms to be more vulnerable or - drawing an analogy from existing literature – 
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more unstable, what does this imply about other possible channels that may explain the gender-
crime relationship? 
 
The importance of crime against firms for developing countries cannot be understated. Increase 
in crime against firms is likely to deteriorate the crucial business environment for many 
developing countries, and thus be a huge deterrent for economic growth. Most of the existing 
literature on crime uses count-level data, focusing on the incidence of crime or typical crime 
rates. Very few studies have examined crimes against firms, or even the burden of crime, as 
measured by losses due to crime. Older studies have found that firms have higher rates of 
victimization than households – in a British crime surveys, 24% of retailers and manufacturers 
were burgled in 1993 in contrast to 5.6% of households (Hopkins, 2002).  A few studies have 
explored various relationships between firm characteristics and crime against firms. Using a 
sample of Latin American countries, it is found that large firms experience more crime than 
small firms, although small firms face a larger burden of crime (Amin, 2009). It has also been 
shown that for informal firms in Africa owned by immigrants are more susceptible to crime than 
native owned firms. The relationship between firms with female owners and various outcomes 
has also been under researched. Amin (2010) finds that for unregistered firms in Africa, female 
owned firms tend to be smaller in size than male owned firms. The present study adds to the 
literature on crime against firms by exploring the linkages between female ownership, losses due 
to crime, and the influence of macro-economic characteristics and indicators. 
 
What are the implications of a positive gender-crime relationship? Although, identifying the 
exact causal link is beyond this study due to data limitations, there are a couple of reasons for 
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such a relationship. One possibility is that women are less well off and perceived to be weaker or 
more vulnerable in developing economies, and thus easier targets for criminal activity, 
essentially implying a gender-bias in crime against firms. Another plausible reason is that firms 
with a female owner have a bias towards certain industries, sizes or firm types and thus it is a 
combination of certain characteristics highly correlated with firms that have a female ownership 
that results in this positive correlation.  
 
The goal of this paper is two-fold. First, this study will quantify the effect of female ownership 
on the burden of crime on firms. Second, the study will explore how several macro-economic 
variables influence this gender-crime relationship – whether they strengthen or weaken it – and 
thus illuminating possible macro channels. We use a unique firm level dataset with about 12,000 
firms in 27 developing countries maintained by the World Bank’s Enterprise Analysis unit 
(Enterprise Surveys) to examine this relationship. We find that firms that have a female owner 
face a 0.030 standard deviation increase in crime losses over sales, while firms that have both a 
female owner and manager face a 0.059 standard deviation increase in crime losses over sales 
relative to the remaining firms. High levels of growth, development, good governance, and high 
religious fractionalization within an economy is seen to reduce this gender bias with regards to 
female ownership and crime. We also find that high growth, and a larger police force mitigates 
the positive relationship between crime losses and firms with female owners and managers, 
while high levels of schooling in the overall economy reverses the relationship – firms with 
female owners and managers experience lower losses from crime than firms without female 
owners and managers. We use % of females in parliament, and whether a state subsidizes 
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childcare or has a public provision for it as instruments for female ownership and find that the 
results are retained, if not magnified. The results are also robust to various sensitivity checks. 
 
Section 2 describes the data, section 3 provides the estimation and results, and sections 4, 5, and 
6 provide instrumental variable estimations, robustness checks, and conclusions respectively. 
 
2 Data and Main Variables 
The data for firm level variables are collected by the World Bank’s Enterprise Analysis Unit 
(Enterprise Surveys). The Enterprise Surveys use standard survey instruments to collect firm-
level data on a country's business environment from business owners and top managers. The 
surveys cover a broad range of topics including access to finance, corruption, infrastructure, 
crime, competition, labor, obstacles to growth and performance measures. The survey is 
designed to be representative of a country’s private non-agricultural economy and only registered 
firms with at least five employees are included in the sample. The data consists of a random 
sample of 12,000 firms across 27 developing countries in different regions stratified by firm size, 
location, and sector.  The survey year ranges between 2007 and 2009. Details of countries in the 
sample and their respective survey years can be found in the first column of table A3 in the 
appendix. The survey data and questionnaire can be accessed from the website: 
http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/ 
 
 
2.1 Dependent variable 
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The dependent variable utilized is losses due to crime as a percentage of annual sales. This 
variable is derived from the survey question: “In fiscal year [insert fiscal year], what are the 
estimated losses as a result of theft, robbery, vandalism or arson that occurred on establishment’s 
premises calculated as a percent of annual sales or the total annual value of the losses?” 
For total values of crime, the percentage over sales is calculated. Crime losses as a % of sale 
capture the intensity of crime. We make no distinction between a firm that has experienced no 
crime and a firm that has experienced crime but incurred no losses. Both firms get a zero value 
for the dependent variable. The variable averages 0.72% in the sample with a standard deviation 
of 3.9%.  Using country averages across all firms, Azerbaijan has the lowest amount of crime 
losses at 0.20% of sales, while El Salvador has the highest with 1.73%. Data source and 
description of the variable can be found in table A1, with summary statistics in table A2. 
 
2.2 Explanatory variable 
The main variable of interest is a dummy representing whether or not a firm has one or more 
female owners. The dummy equals 1 to a yes response to the following survey question: "Are 
any of the owners female?" About 42% of the firms in the sample have at least one female 
owner. Using country level averages we find that the Philippines has the highest percentage of 
firms with female owners (65.68%), while Azerbaijan has the lowest (13.28%).  
 
As a further check, we replace the explanatory variable with a dummy that captures whether or 
not a firm has both at least one female owner and a top female manager. Using country level 
averages, we find that the Mongolia has the highest % of firms with at least a female owner and 
female top manager (36.16%), while Azerbaijan has the lowest (3.26%). The country average 
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crime losses and number of female owners and managers are presented in table A4 for each 
country in the appendix.  
2. 3 Other explanatory variables 
We control for several firm level and country level variables. The degree of crime a firm faces 
may depend on its size, the sector it belongs to, and its locale (Amin, 2009; Glaeser and 
Sacerodote, 1999). We control for firm size using dummies for small and medium firms. A small 
firm is defined as a firm with less than 20 employees, while a medium firm has workers between 
20 and 99. We also have a dummy for manufacturing firms. A priori it is not clear whether a 
manufacturing firm should have higher crime losses with respect to other sectors, but it is quite 
possible that in some countries, a particular sector is more susceptible to crime. We also include 
a city size dummy which takes the value of 1 if the city has a population of 250,000 of greater, or 
is a capital city, and takes a value of 0 otherwise. All these variables are from the Enterprise 
Survey’s data set. 
 
At the country level we control for Real GDP per Capita growth, the Gini index, and Real GNI 
per capita given their prominence in the literature (Fajnzylber et al, 2002). We control for the 
number of police personnel per 100,000 of population. The variable is obtained from United 
Nations Survey on Crime Trends and the Operations of Criminal Justice Systems. The variable is 
typically lagged by 1 year, however due to data constraints, for some countries the lag is not 
exactly one year previous, but a few years before in certain cases. Similarly, for years where Gini 
and GNI per capita data are not available we use the data for the closest available year. The exact 
year of data used for number of police, GNI per capita and the Gini index are presented in table 
A3 in the appendix. We also control for country size using the total population of the country. 
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Finally, we also control for the level of inequality in the country using the Gini index. These data 
are available from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators.  Data source and 
description of the variable can be found in table A1, with summary statistics in table A2. 
 
3. Estimation 
We estimate following equation using OLS. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
9 ij 10
(1)     
                          LargeCity
ij ij j j j j j ij ij
ij ij
crimeloss Fem GDPgr Policelag GNIcap GINI Population Small Medium
Manf
β β β β β β β β
β β ε
= + + + + + + +
+ + +
 
Where cr is the losses due to crime as a % of sales, is a dummy representing female 
ownership (which is later replaced by female manager and ownership), is the lagged 
number of police per 100,000 population, is the real GDP per capita growth, GNI is 
the real GNI per capita, GI is the gini coefficient, is the total population of the 
economy,  and 
imeloss
Small
Fem
Population
Policelag
GDPgr cap
NI
Medium are firm size dummies, L is a dummy for cities with 
population of 250,000 and greater, or capital cities, and finally 
argeCity
Manf is a dummy for 
manufacturing firms.  
 
All estimates are based on standard errors clustered at the country level. In the later sections, we 
add additional variables and interact them with the variable of interest to elucidate several 
relationships. The usual econometric issues of endogeneity and omitted variable bias are of a 
concern in the estimation. Reverse causality is less of an issue as if expected crime leads to lower 
female ownership under the assumption that firms with female owners are easy targets for 
criminal activity, then any positive relationship we uncover between female firm ownership and 
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crime would be even stronger than the results we obtain once reverse causality is accounted for. 
On the other hand omitted variable bias is an issue that is challenging to overcome given data 
limitations. We address this by using the instrumental variable regression method instruments 
and various checks as presented in the robustness section below. 
 
3.1 Base Regression Results 
All magnitudes discussed in the text are presented in standard deviation units, unless indicated. 
The figures shown in the tables are in nominal units, not standard deviation units. Since the 
dependent variable is a ratio of losses due to crime to sales, any reference to a reduction in crime 
refers to a reduction in losses due to crime as a share of sales. The base results are present in 
table 1. Column1 indicates that firms that have a female owner face a 0.03 standard deviation 
increase in crime losses, significant at 10%1. The sign and significance of these results are 
unchanged when the estimation is done without any controls. The reduction in crime losses when 
the controls are excluded from the estimation is 0.035 standard deviation units, significant at 
10%. Since there is the possibility that a firm may have many male owners and just one female 
owner, and thus weakening the correlation between crime and female ownership, I examine the 
effect of a firm having both a female owner and manager on crime. The justification being that 
when a firm has both a female owner and manager, there is a more female visibility than female 
owner alone. Column 2 of table 1 reports the results for firms with both a female owner and 
manager.  Firms with both a female owner and manager experience a 0.059 standard deviation 
increase in losses due to crime, significant at 10%. This result is consistent with the literature for 
                                                 
1 The sign and significance of these results are unchanged when the estimation is done without any controls. The 
reduction in crime losses when the controls are excluded from the estimation is 0.035 standard deviations, 
significant at 10% 
9 
 
individual level crime where the proportion of female headed households is positively correlated 
with crime (Demombynes and Ozler, 2005; Kelly, 2000). 
 
 A few other results stand out. Both real GDP per capita growth and Real GNI per capita have a 
negative and highly significant effect on losses due to crime2. Although the negative effect of 
GDP per capita growth is not surprising considering individual level crime (Fajnzylber et al., 
2002; Soares, 2004), the negative effect of GNI per capita crime has been less robust in the 
literature (Soares, 2004). Thus development may not be criminogenic at the firm level. The Gini 
coefficient and dummy for large or capital city are not significant despite their well documented 
effect on individual level crime (Dutta, 2009; Glaeser and Sacerdote, 1996). An increase in the 
police force reduces losses due to crime, a result in the literature that was initially difficult to 
uncover due to identification issues, but eventually found some support (Levitt, 2004; Di Tella 
and Schargrodsky, 2004). The size of the country in terms of population has a positive effect on 
the dependent variable, implying that firms in larger countries experience greater losses due to 
crime than smaller ones. 
 
Certain firm characteristics are found to be significant determinants of the losses due to crime. 
Small or medium firms are more likely to experience higher losses due to crime than large firms. 
This may be potentially due to the security measures that large firms are able to implement. 
Manufacturing firms are less likely to sustain heavy losses due to crime compared to service 
sector firms. 
 
                                                 
2 Due to the lack of continuous data for GNI per capita for some countries, we use the GDP growth rate instead of 
the GNI growth rate. This is typical in the literature (Fajnzylber et al, 2002). The results for GDP per capita growth 
are retained if we use the level of GDP per capita instead of GNI per capita. 
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We now flesh out the relationship between gender and crime against firms. Several factors may 
reduce or accentuate the degree of losses due to crime experienced by firms with a female owner 
relative to firms with no female owner. Such potential factors such as economic growth, income, 
industry, schooling, religious fractionalization and governance are explored. Probing how the 
relationship between crime and female ownership is weakened or strengthened by the above 
factors will inform us on whether the stated factors benefit females more than males as far as 
crime is concerned.  
 
3.2 Growth and Development 
The interaction term between firms with female owners and GDP per capita growth, or firms 
with female owner and GNI per capita is negative and significant at 10% for the former, and 5% 
for the latter. Firms with at least one female owner experience higher losses due to crime than 
firms with all male owners, after interacting GDP per capita growth with female ownership. This 
relationship ceases to be significant at the sample maximum of GDP per capita growth, and 
actually retains significance and increases in magnitude at the sample mean of GDP per capita 
growth. The bottom of column 1 of table 2 presents the magnitude of the effects. At the sample 
mean of GDP per capita growth we have a 0.03 standard deviation increase in crime, while at the 
sample minimum of GDP per capita growth we have an 0.084 standard deviation increase in 
crime, the result being significant at 5%. The turning point for economic growth in the sample, 
beyond which there is no significant relationship at all conventional levels of significance 
between having or not having a female owner and crime losses, is 3.65% which is around the 
66th percentile of the sample. This is about one percentage point greater than the mean economic 
growth of the sample.  
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 The results are starker for real GNI per capita, as indicated in column 2 of table 2. At the sample 
mean and minimum of GNI per capita, female ownership has a positive and significant on crime 
when interacting female ownership with GNI per capita. However, the relationship between 
female ownership and crime becomes negative and significant effect at the sample maximum of 
GNI per capita. The magnitudes are indicated at the bottom of column 2 of table 2. At the sample 
mean, minimum, and maximum levels of GNI per capita, the effect on the dependent variable is 
0.030, 0.064 and negative 0.074 standard deviations respectively with a significance of at least 
10%. The relationship between female ownership and crime looses significance at the GNI per 
capita of about 6,700USD. The negative relationship between female firm ownership and crime 
becomes significant only at the GNI per capita of 14,100USD, which is essentially the maximum 
value of real GNI per capital in the sample. The strong implication here is that development may 
be beneficial to female owners of firms more than to firms with only male owners. 
 
The implication of the above results may indicate that faster economic growth reduces the 
chance that firms with female ownerships are likely to be victims of crime. More interestingly, at 
high levels of GNI per capita, firms with no female owners are significantly less likely to suffer 
larger losses due to crime than males. It is understandable that female owned firms face fewer 
losses due to crime as a country develops, as institutions develop that are favorable to them. 
However, it is unclear why such a relationship turns to the opposite direction against men.   
 
3.3 Industry 
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The interaction term between firms with female owners and firms in the manufacturing sector is 
negative and significant at 10% in its impact on the dependent variable (table 2, column 3). 
While female owned firms face more losses from crime than male owned firms, the difference is 
significantly larger for non-manufacturing firms than manufacturing firms. Non-manufacturing 
firms with female owners experience a 0.062 standard deviation increase in crime losses 
significant at 5%, in contrast to 0.003 standard deviation increase for manufacturing firms which 
is insignificant at all conventional levels of significance.  
 
3.4 Schooling  
One of the common deterrents of criminal activities is the presence of labor market opportunities 
(Becker, 1968). The results in column 1 of table 3 show that the interaction between firms with a 
female owner and years of schooling in the economy on average is negative and significant at 
1%. At the mean level of schooling, firms with a female owner experience greater losses due to 
crime when interacting schooling with female ownership. This result is maintained at the 
minimum level of years of schooling, however, at the sample maximum of schooling, female 
ownership has a negative and significant effect on crime. The magnitudes are presented at the 
bottom of column 1 in table 3. At the sample mean, minimum, and maximum levels of years of 
schooling, the effect on the dependent variable is 0.034, 0.166 and negative 0.061 standard 
deviations respectively with a significance of at least 5%.   Assuming a larger number of years of 
schooling is positively correlated with higher education for females, one interpretation could be 
that females are more educated and less vulnerable in economies with higher schooling, and 
consequently experience fewer losses due to crime than males. Explaining why firms with all 
owners being male results in an increase in losses due to crime is more difficult, with a 
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possibility being that in economies with high education, females tend to be better educated than 
males. 
 
 
3.5 Religious Fractionalization 
Social disorganization theories indicate that factors that diminishes the effectiveness of informal 
social controls increase criminal activity (Kelly, 2000). However, in the case for females, 
speaking specifically of religious fractionalization, a greater diverse religious community may 
limit any restrictions placed on females for any particular religions, and thus there may be 
discriminated less. The interaction between religious fractionalization and firms with female 
owners is negative and significant at 5%. We find that at the mean and minimum level of 
religious fractionalization, female ownership has a 0.030 and 0.082 standard deviation increase 
in crime respectively with a significance level of at least 5% as shown in the bottom of column 2 
in table 3.  At the maximum level of fractionalization in the sample, the relationship between 
female ownership in firms and crime losses lose their significance. The turning point of religious 
fractionalization beyond which the relationship between female ownership and crime losses lose 
their significance is 0.37 which is around the 62nd percentile of the sample. This lends some 
credence to the hypothesis that in most religiously fractionalized societies, females are least 
vulnerable, and economic growth is more effective in reducing the susceptibility of females to 
crime than of males. 
 
3.6 Governance 
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In column 3 of table 3, we use ICRG’s Quality of government indicator as measure of 
governance. Note that higher values of the variable indicate better governance. The interaction 
term between quality of government and firms with female owners is negative and significant at 
10%. We find that at the mean and min level of governance, economic growth has a negative and 
significant effect on crime. This relationship loses significance at the maximum level of the 
governance index. The magnitude of the reduction in crime due to economic growth is 0.032 and 
0.088 standard deviations at the sample mean and minimum respectively, significant at 5%. That 
is a high level of governance in terms of quality is associated with  firms with female owners 
being less likely to be targeted by criminal activity than males.  
 
3.7 Female Managers and Owners 
Given the limitations of the data, it is not possible to know the proportion of owners that are 
female, but only whether or not a firm has a female owner. Thus, in order to capture firms that 
have a significance female presence, we consider the effect on crime losses due when a firm has 
both a female owner and a female manager. As indicated by the results shown in Tables 4, the 
qualitative results are similar for GDP per capita growth and years of schooling, but with a 
greater magnitude in the effects when compared to the estimates of female ownership alone. The 
magnitude of the effects of female ownership and management almost doubles when including 
the interaction term between GDP per capita growth and female ownership and management. 
There are two differences however. Including the interaction term between police and female 
ownership and management provides a positive significant relationship between the police and 
female ownership and management and crime at the sample mean and minimum levels of police. 
However, at the maximum level of police, the relationship turns insignificant.  Secondly the 
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effect of a manufacturing firm having a female owner on losses due to crime is insignificant for 
female ownership but positive and significant for female ownership and management. One 
possible explanation could be that for manufacturing firms, female owners are hardly present on 
location but female managers are. This would explain the positive and significant effect that 
female owners and managers have on losses due to crime for manufacturing firms. However, 
there is no clear reason why non-manufacturing firms with a female owner and manager show no 
significant difference in losses from crime than non manufacturing firms with all male owners 
and managers. 
 
One major concern about the estimations is that the relationship between female ownership and 
losses due to crime may be spurious. Essentially, female ownership may be capturing something 
else that is not included in the estimations. We mitigate this possibility by using instruments and 
subjecting the base estimates to several robustness checks. 
 
4. Instrumental Variables 
We use two instruments – the percentage of women in parliament, and whether the government 
either subsidizes childcare or has laws establishing the public provision of childcare. The latter 
variable is obtained from the World Bank’s Women, Business and the Law – Removing Barriers 
to Economic Inclusion Report. The report examines laws and regulations that affect women’s 
ability to earn an income, either by starting and running their own businesses or by getting jobs. 
Information about laws and regulations that affect women were gathered from family lawyers, 
labor lawyers, and civil society organizations in their respective economies. 
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We expect that public provision of childcare or government childcare subsidies ease constraints 
on women in the labor market and thus encourage female ownership and participation in the 
labor markets. There is also a tendency in developing countries for women to substitute private 
sector jobs for public sector jobs. Typically in developing countries, the % of employment of 
women in the public sector is greater than the % of total employment in the public sector 
(Hammouya, 1999). Therefore a higher % of women in parliament may indicate a preference 
towards public sector jobs by women as opposed to the private sector. Thus we expect a negative 
correlation between female ownership in the private sector and % of women in parliament. A 
priori there is no reason to expect a direct link between women in parliament, and public 
childcare provisions on crime. The first stage estimations are presented in column 1 of table 6. 
As expected, childcare subsidies have a positive relationship with female ownership while 
women in parliament have a negative correlation with female ownership.  The second stage 
results are presented in column 1 of table 5. The effect of female ownership of firms is positive 
and significant at 1%. As indicated in the bottom of column 1, the Sargen-Hansen test of 
overidentifying restrictions is not rejected for all conventional levels of significance, thus we 
cannot reject the null that all the instruments are valid. We also reject that the estimation is 
underidentified at 10% level of significance. We use the same instruments for the estimation 
where the variable of interest is firms with both at least a female owner and manager. The first 
stage results are presented in column 2 of table 6, while the second stage is presented in column 
2 of table 5. Although the sign of the coefficient is positive and significant at 1% with the 
overidentifying test indicating the instruments are valid, the estimation fails the test of 
underidentification. Thus, we include an additional instrument which is a dummy equaling 1 if 
employers are required to provide breaks for nursing mothers by law. The distinction between 
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childcare subsidies and a law requiring breaks for nursing mothers is that the former alleviates 
women’s constraints in the private sector, while the latter may make it costlier for employees in 
the private sector to hire female workers in order to follow the regulations. Another explanation 
may be that regulations for nursing breaks may proxy regulation stringency overall. This would 
also be especially true for females in managerial positions. Thus we expect a negative 
relationship between a law requiring employers to provide nursing breaks for mothers and firms 
with female managers and a positive relationship between childcare subsidies and firms with 
female managers. The first stage IV regression is presented in column 3 of table 6. As expected 
public childcare subsidies have a positive relationship with firms with both female managers and 
owners while nursing-break-regulations has a negative effect of firms with female managers and 
owners. The second stage results are presented in column 3 of table 5. With the addition of the 
“nursing break regulation” instrument, we have a positive coefficient for female owners and 
managers on losses due to crime significant at 1 % as indicated in. The instruments pass both the 
overidentification and underidentification tests3.  
 
 
5. Robustness 
We check for the robustness in terms of model specification. Several studies have shown that 
demographics (Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002; Kelly, 2000; Di Tella and Schargrodsky), corruption 
(Gaviria, 2002), ethnic division (fajnzylber, lederman, and loayza, 2000; Ghosh et al., 2011), 
prison population (Kovandzic and Sloan, 2002; levitt, 2004), and government spending (Naidoo, 
                                                 
3 As indicated in the first stage results for estimates using both female owner and manager as the variable of interest, 
the % of women in parliament variable is not significant. All the results are retained whether or not we include the 
% of women in parliament. However, including this variable enables us to pass the underidentification test at 5% 
level of significant. 
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2006) are factors that influence crime. We add sets of variables that proxy for the 
aforementioned factors and present the results in table A5. We also include firm level variables 
such as total employees and security costs as a % of total sales and check if they affect our 
estimation of interest. As shown in table A5, including these sets of variables neither improves 
the goodness of fit, and thus does not improve explanatory power of the model, nor reduce the 
significance of the variable of interest. 
  
We also worry that extreme observations in the sample may be driving the results. Thus we omit 
the top 1%, bottom 1 %, and top and bottom 1% observations of losses due to crime, to see if our 
results are retained. As indicated in table A6, the significance of our results is unaffected. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This study contributes to the literature by examining the relationship between female ownership 
and management of firms and crime against firms, a fairly under-researched area. The paper 
finds a positive relationship between firm losses due to crime and female ownership. Expressed 
in terms of standard deviations, we find that firms with at least one female owner experience a 
0.030 standard deviation increase in losses due to crime over total sales. This figure is 0.059 
standard deviations for firms with at least one female owner and a female manager. One possible 
explanation for this is that there exists a gender bias in crime against firms – firms with a female 
presence at the upper level of the decision making process are preferred targets for criminal 
activity. We find that high levels of economic growth, development, good governance, and high 
religious fractionalization within an economy is seen to reduce this gender bias with regards to 
female ownership and crime losses. We also find that high economic growth, and a larger police 
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force mitigates the positive relationship between crime losses and firms with female owners and 
managers, while high levels of schooling actually reverses the relationship – firms with female 
owners and managers experience lower losses due to crime than firms without female owners 
and managers. 
 
Possible ways to extend this paper would be to check if the results hold for developed economies 
as well. It would also be interesting to validate these results using data with some time variation. 
Finally, it would be valuable to revisit household level crime and see if the positive relationship 
between female headed households and crime still persists for well off female headed 
households. 
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TABLE 1: GENDER AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS  
 OLS: % Loss Over Sales due to Crime OLS: % Loss Over Sales due to Crime
 1 2 
 
Firm with Female Owner 
 
0.1181* 
 
[0.0632]  
Firm with female owner and manager 
 
0.2345* 
[0.1251] 
 
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
-0.0808*** -0.0862*** 
[0.0208] [0.0243] 
 
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
-0.0011* -0.0011** 
[0.0005] [0.0005] 
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
 
-0.0058*** -0.0057*** 
[0.0012] [0.0012] 
GINI  
 
 
-0.0065 -0.0086 
[0.0113] [0.0129] 
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0034* 0.0034** 
[0.0017] [0.0016] 
Small firms 
 
 
0.4023*** 0.3535*** 
[0.0940] [0.0982] 
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1664** 0.1345* 
[0.0658] [0.0757] 
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0331 0.0536 
[0.0953] [0.0900] 
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.2238** -0.2323** 
[0.0813] [0.0879] 
Number of Countries 27 27 
Number of Observations 12274 12499 
Change in the Standard Deviation of the 
Dependent Variable when firm has a female 
owner (column 1) of female owner and 
manager (column 2) 
0.030* 0.059* 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 2: GENDER AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS (LOSSES DUE TO CRIME/SALES) 
 Female Owner x GDP Growth  
Female Owner x Real GNI 
per capita 
Female Owner x 
Manufacturing 
 1 2 3
 
Firm with female owner 
  
0.1886** 0.2625** 
 
0.2424** 
[0.0851]
 
[0.0982] [0.1078]
Female Owner x Real GDP per Capita 
Growth  
 
-0.0260*  
[0.0149]  
Female Owner 
 x Real GNI per Capita  
 
-0.0039**  
[0.0017]  
Female Owner x Manufacturing  
 
 
-0.2318*
[0.1261]
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.0695*** -0.0807*** -0.0810***
[0.0219] [0.0207] [0.0209]
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
-0.0010* -0.0010* -0.0011*
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0005]
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
 
-0.0058*** -0.0042*** -0.0058***
[0.0012] [0.0013] [0.0012]
GINI  
 
 
-0.0062 -0.0066 -0.0067
[0.0113] [0.0112] [0.0114]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0034* 0.0033* 0.0035*
[0.0018] [0.0017] [0.0017]
Small firms 
 
 
0.3945*** 0.4024*** 0.4038***
[0.0950] [0.0939] [0.0948]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1609** 0.1654** 0.1700**
[0.0650] [0.0649] [0.0659]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0321 0.0358 0.0367
[0.0951] [0.0946] [0.0955]
Manufacturing 
 
-0.2240** -0.2235** -0.1273
[0.0810] [0.0812] [0.0787]
Number of Countries 27 27 27
Number of Observations 12274 12274 12274
Change in the Standard Deviation of the 
Dependent Variable when firm has a 
female owner    
 
Using Mean 0.030* 0.030**  
Using Min 0.084** 0.064***  
Using Max 0.019 -0.074*  
Interacted Dummy =0 0.062**
Interacted Dummy =1 0.003
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 3: GENDER AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS (LOSSES DUE TO CRIME/SALES) 
 
Female Owner x 
Years of Schooling 
Female Owner x 
Religious 
Fractionalization 
Female Owner x 
Quality of 
Government 
 1 2 3
Female Owner 
 
  
0.9819*** 0.3266*** 0.8046**
[0.2107] [0.1027] [0.3660]
Female Owner x Years of Schooling 
 
-0.1000***
[0.0238]
Years of Schooling 
 
0.001
[0.0409]
Female Owner x Religious Fractionalization 
 
-0.6208**
[0.2410]
Religious Fractionalization 
 
0.5462**
[0.2406]
Female Owner x Quality of Government  
 
-1.2920*
[0.6641]
Quality of Government  
 
 
-0.819
[0.8113]
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.0929*** -0.0752*** -0.0879***
[0.0299] [0.0223] [0.0208]
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
-0.0017* -0.0009* -0.0014**
[0.0009] [0.0005] [0.0005]
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
-0.0055*** -0.0051*** -0.0031
[0.0010] [0.0012] [0.0018]
GINI  
 
 
-0.0187 0.0005 -0.014
[0.0232] [0.0129] [0.0120]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0034* 0.0041** 0.0030*
[0.0017] [0.0017] [0.0016]
Small firms 
 
 
0.4637*** 0.4012*** 0.4082***
[0.0947] [0.0933] [0.1024]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.2283*** 0.1640** 0.1768**
[0.0617] [0.0666] [0.0660]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.057 0.0372 0.0253
[0.1147] [0.0943] [0.1023]
Manufacturing 
 
-0.2430** -0.2260** -0.2385**
[0.1024] [0.0817] [0.0889]
Number of Countries 22 27 24
Number of Observations 10661 12274 11242
Change in the Standard Deviation of the 
Dependent Variable when firm has a female 
owner    
Using Mean 0.034** 0.030** 0.032**
Using Min 0.166*** 0.082*** 0.088**
Using Max -0.061** -0.025 -0.054
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 4: GENDER AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS (LOSSES DUE TO CRIME/SALES) 
 
Female Owner &
Manager x GDP 
Growth  
Female Owner & 
Manager x lagged 
Police 
Female Owner & 
Manager x Years of 
Schooling 
Female Owner & 
Manager x 
Manufacturing 
 1 2 3 4
 
Firm with Female Owner & manager 
  
 
0.4054** 1.0427*** 2.1067*** 0.1255 
[0.1587] [0.2078] [0.5234] [0.1327]
Female Owner & Manager x Real GDP 
per Capita Growth  
 
-0.0554**
[0.0259]
Female Owner & Manager x lagged 
Police 
 
-0.0028***
[0.0006]
Female Owner & Manager x Years of 
Schooling 
 
-0.2218*** 
[0.0548] 
Years of Schooling 
 
 
-0.0201 
[0.0391] 
Female Owner & Manager x 
Manufacturing  
 
 
0.2252*
[0.1271]
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
 
-0.0763*** -0.0856*** -0.1018*** -0.0861***
[0.0261] [0.0237] [0.0343] [0.0243]
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
-0.0011* -0.0008 -0.0017* -0.0011**
[0.0005] [0.0005] [0.0010] [0.0005]
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
-0.0056*** -0.0056*** -0.0052*** -0.0056***
[0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0012]
GINI  
 
 
-0.008 -0.0093 -0.0242 -0.0085
[0.0129] [0.0128] [0.0246] [0.0129]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0034** 0.0029* 0.0039** 0.0035**
[0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016] [0.0016]
Small firms 
 
 
0.3511*** 0.3513*** 0.4081*** 0.3525***
[0.0977] [0.0990] [0.1005] [0.0983]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1336* 0.1328* 0.1921** 0.1322*
[0.0758] [0.0754] [0.0743] [0.0757]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0546 0.0579 0.0873 0.0509
[0.0903] [0.0901] [0.1089] [0.0902]
Manufacturing 
 
-0.2297** -0.2275** -0.2470** -0.2668***
[0.0885] [0.0880] [0.1089] [0.0897]
Number of Countries 27 27 22 
Number of Observations 12449 12449 10812 12449
Change in the Standard Deviation of the 
Dependent Variable when firm has a 
female owner & manager    
Using Mean 0.064** 0.056** 0.054** 
24 
 
Using Min 0.178** 0.196*** 0.344*** 
Using Max -0.040 -0.080** -0.150*** 
Interacted Dummy =0 0.031
Interacted Dummy =1 0.088**
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 5: GENDER AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS – INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (SECOND STAGE) 
 
OLS: % Loss Over Sales 
due to Crime 
IV Estimates 
Second Stage Results 
OLS: % Loss Over Sales 
due to Crime 
IV Estimates 
Second Stage Results 
OLS: % Loss Over Sales due to 
Crime 
IV Estimates 
Second Stage Results 
 1 2 3
 
Firm with Female Owner 
 
1.1510*** 
[0.4234]
Firm with female owner and manager 
 
2.2930*** 3.2950***
[0.8847] [1.0433]
 
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
-0.0735*** -0.0708*** -0.0632**
[0.0200] [0.0252] [0.0257]
 
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
-0.0009** -0.0010** -0.0009**
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004]
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
 
-0.0043*** -0.0030** -0.0016
[0.0010] [0.0014] [0.0015]
GINI  
 
 
-0.0004 0.0048 0.0112
[0.0111] [0.0126] [0.0124]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.001 0.0021 0.0014
[0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0018]
Small firms 
 
 
0.4015*** 0.141 0.0311
[0.0905] [0.1355] [0.1871]
Medium firms 
 
 
0.1718** 0.0642 0.0314
[0.0726] [0.0902] [0.1049]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
0.0643 0.083 0.1093
[0.1095] [0.0996] [0.0986]
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.2176** -0.1931** -0.1703*
[0.0877] [0.0945] [0.0894]
Number of Countries 26 26 26
Number of Observations 11478 11634 11634
Instruments 
% of women in parliament, 
State subsidizes or 
provides childcare 
% of women in 
parliament, State 
subsidizes or provides 
childcare 
% of women in parliament, 
State subsidizes or provides 
childcare, Employers required to 
provide breaks for nursing 
mothers 
Under-identification test (Kleibergen-
Paap LM statistic) P-value: 0.0570 0.1192 0.0774 
Hansen J statistic (over-identification 
test of all instruments) p-value: 0.3501 0.8298 0.4339 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE 6: GENDER AND CRIME AGAINST FIRMS – INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLES (FIRST STAGE) 
 
Female Owner: 
 First Stage Results 
 
Female Owner and 
Manager 
 First Stage Results 
 
Female Owner and Manager 
 First Stage Results 
(Additional instrument) 
 1 2 3
 
State subsidizes or provides childcare  0.2256*** 0.1317*** 0.1110*** 
[0.0510]
 
[0.0355]
 
[0.0384]
% of women in parliament  -0.0057*** -0.0017 -0.0019
[0.0015]
 
[0.0017] [0.0017]
 
Employers required to provide breaks 
for nursing mothers  
-0.0834**
[0.0432]
 
Real GDP per Capita Growth 
 
-0.0035 -0.0064 -0.0026
[0.0042] [0.0042] [0.0047]
 
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 
 
 
0.0002 0.0001 -0.0002**
[0.0002] [0.0001] [0.0001]
Real GNI per capita in 100s 
 
 
-0.0011** -0.0013*** -0.0010***
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0004]
GINI  
 
 
-0.0027 -0.0066** -0.0042
[0.0034] [0.0030] [0.0033]
Population in Millions, Total 
 
 
0.0032*** 0.0012*** 0.0005
[0.0005] [0.0004] [0.0006]
Small firms 
 
 
0.0166 0.1114*** 0.1109***
[0.0346] [0.0160] [0.0160]
Medium firms 
 
 
-0.0039 0.0346*** 0.0339***
[0.0277] [0.0088] [0.0087]
Large City or Capital 
 
 
-0.0367 -0.0141 -0.0112
[0.0225] [0.0104] [0.0105]
Manufacturing 
 
 
-0.0101 -0.0209*** -0.0199**
[0.0141] [0.0080] [0.0082]
Number of Countries 26 26 26
Number of Observations 11478 11634 11634
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%, Standard errors in brackets clustered at the country level
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TABLE A1: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition Data Source 
Losses Due to Crime (% of 
sales) 
Response  to the Question:
“In fiscal year [insert fiscal year], what are the 
estimated losses as a result of theft, robbery, 
vandalism or arson that occurred on 
establishment’s premises calculated as a percent of 
annual sales or the total annual value of the 
losses?” 
For actual values, % of sales was calculated. 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Experienced Crime 
Response to the Question:
“In fiscal year [insert last complete fiscal year], has 
this establishment experienced losses as a result of 
theft, robbery, vandalism or arson?” 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Real GDP per Capita Growth Real GDP per Capita Growth Rate, constant 2000 USD 
Word Development Indicators (WDI), 
World Bank 
Police per 100,000 persons 
lagged 
Police per 100,000 persons lagged. Due to data 
constraints, for some countries the lag is not 
exactly lagged by year. Specifics of all lag years can 
be found in the appendix. 
United Nations Survey on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems 
Firm with Female Owner Yes Response to Question:"Are any of the owners female?" 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Female Owner and Manager 
Yes Response to Questions:
“Is the Top Manager female?” and "Are any of the 
owners female?" 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Real GNI per capita (in 100s)  GNI per Capita, Constant 2000 USD Word Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
GINI Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while an index of 100 implies perfect inequality. 
WDI, World Bank, Development Research 
Group 
Population, Total in millions  Total Population Word Development Indicators (WDI), World Bank 
Small firms Dummy is 1 if firm is small (<20) Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Medium firms Dummy is 1 if firm is medium (20-99) Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Large City or Capital Dummy is 1 if city is either the capital or has more than 250,000 population 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Manufacturing Dummy is 1 for manufacturing firms Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Quality of Government 
 Mean value of the ICRG governance variables 
“Corruption”, “Law and Order”, and 
“Bureaucracy Quality”, scaled 0-1. Higher values 
indicate better quality of government. 1990-2007 
average used. 
International Country Risk Guide – The 
PRS Group 
Polity 2 
Index of Democracy (Polity 2). Score between -10 
and 10 that indicate how democratic a country. 
Values increase with greater democracy. 1990-
2007 average used. 
 
Polity IV, 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/poli
ty4.htm 
 
 
Years of Schooling 
Average Years of Schooling of Population over 
15. 1990-2007 average used. 1990-2007 average 
used. 
Barro and Lee (2010) 
Religion Fractionalization Probability that two randomly selected people from a given country belong to different religions 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
and Wacziarg (2003) 
Employees 
Response to Question:
“At the end of fiscal year [insert last complete 
fiscal year], how many permanent, full-time 
Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
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employees did this establishment employ?”
Ethnic Fractionalization 
Probability that two randomly selected people 
from a given country belong to different 
ethnicities 
Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, 
and Wacziarg (2003) 
Total Employees Total number of full time permanent workers Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Security Costs as a % of sales Enterprise Surveys, World Bank
Corruption (Transparency 
International) 
Corruption Perception Index: 10 point scale 
where higher values indicate less corruption. 1995-
2009 average used. 
Transparency International
ww.transparency.org 
Voter Turnout  
Turnout in parliamentary elections measured as 
the total number of votes cast divided by the 
number of registered voters. 
IDEA: International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance 
http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm 
 
Proportion of Female 
Population Population, female (% of total) 
WDI, World Bank 
Percentage of Population in 
Urban Agglomerates 
Population in urban agglomerations of more than 
one million is the percentage of a country's 
population living in metropolitan areas that in 
2000 had a population of more than one million 
people. 
 
WDI, World Bank 
 
Population Density People per sq. km of land area WDI, World Bank  
Proportion of Population 
between 15 and 64 Population ages 15-64 (% of total) 
WDI, World Bank 
Government Consumption 
over GDP Total government consumption over GDP 
Penn World Tables 
Total Investment over GDP Total public and private investment over GDP Penn World Tables 
Adult Prison Capacity 
Prisons refer to “Prisons, Penal Institutions or 
Correctional Institutions” which means all public 
and privately financed institutions where persons 
are deprived of their liberty. 
United Nations Survey on Crime Trends 
and the Operations of Criminal Justice 
Systems 
% of women in parliament Proportion of seats held by women in national parliaments (%) 
WDI, World Bank 
State subsidizes or provides 
childcare 
Answer “Yes” to the question “Are there laws 
establishing the public provision of childcare or 
does the state subsidize childcare for children 
under the age of primary education?” 
Women, Business and the Law 2012, 
World Bank 
Employers required to provide 
breaks for nursing mothers 
Answer “Yes” to the question “Are employers 
required to provide break time for nursing 
mothers?” 
 
Women, Business and the Law 2012, 
World Bank 
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TABLE A2: SUMMARY STATISTICS 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Data Unit 
Losses Due to Crime (% of sales) 0.716 3.942 0.000 100.000 Firm 
Experienced Crime 0.232 0.000 1.000 Firm
Firm with Female Owner 0.419 0.000 1.000 Firm
Female Owner and Manager 0.152 0.000 1.000 Firm
GDP per Capita Growth 2.656 4.213 -5.529 10.192 Country
Police per 100,000 persons lagged 287.894 108.187 90.110 480.013 Country
Real GNI per capita (in 100s) 37.345 31.014 2.257 141.816 Country
GINI 39.826 7.768 25.810 52.330 Country
Population, Total in millions 28.615 27.065 1.353 141.816 Country
Small firms 0.369 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Medium firms 0.378 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Large City or Capital 0.627 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Manufacturing 0.537 0.000 1.000 Firm 
Quality of Government 0.525 0.101 0.351 0.791 Country
Polity 2 6.153 3.926 -5.647 10.000 Country
Years of Schooling 8.497 1.835 3.152 12.266 Country
Religion Fractionalization 0.335 0.201 0.005 0.685 Country
Employees 121.246 478.223 1.000 20843 Firm
Ethnic Fractionalization 0.383 0.173 0.118 0.663 Country 
Total Employees 121.246 478.223 1.000 20843 Firm 
Security Costs as a % of sales 1.575 5.798 0.000 384.615 Firm 
Corruption (Transparency 
International) 3.369 0.960 1.982 6.091 Country 
Voter Turnout (IDEA) 0.718 0.089 0.460 0.893 Country 
Proportion of Female Population 51.040 1.437 49.165 54.020 Country 
Percentage of Population in Urban 
Agglomerates 21.463 9.672 4.406 39.027 Country 
Population Density 93.841 82.521 1.610 290.871 Country 
Proportion of Population between 
15 and 64 64.912 4.083 56.745 70.721 Country 
Government Consumption over 
GDP 0.081 0.038 0.047 0.213 Country 
Total Investment over GDP 0.210 0.039 0.150 0.311 Country 
Adult Prison Capacity 34656 37589 1017 127079 Country 
% of women in parliament 21.258 10.215 4.200 41.600 Country 
State subsidizes or provides 
childcare 0.838 0.368 0.000 1.000 Country 
Employers required to provide 
breaks for nursing mothers 0.881 0.323 0.000 1.000 Country 
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TABLE A3: POLICE, GINI, AND GNI PER CAPITA DATA AND SURVEY YEAR 
Country Survey Year Police per 100,000 persons 
lagged Year 
GINI GNI per Capita
Argentina 2009 2008 2009 2009
Azerbaijan 2008  2006 2008 2008
Belarus 2007  2004 2007 2004
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2008  2007 2007 2007
Costa Rica 2009  2006 2009 2009
Czech Republic 2008  2007 1996 2008
Ecuador 2009  2006 2009 2009
El Salvador 2009  2006 2007 2009
Estonia 2008  2007 2004 2008
Fyr Macedonia 2008  2006 2008 2005
Hungary 2008  2007 2007 2008
Kazakhstan 2008  2007 2007 2008
Latvia 2008  2007 2008 2008
Lithuania 2008  2007 2008 2008
Moldova 2008  2007 2008 2008
Mongolia 2008  2004 2008 2000
Nepal 2008  2006 2004 2000
Nicaragua 2009  2006 2005 2009
Paraguay 2009  2006 2008 2009
Peru 2009  2004 2009 2009
Philippines 2008  2007 2006 2008
Poland 2008  2007 2008 2008
Romania 2008  2007 2008 2008
Slovak Republic 2008  2007 1996 2008
Slovenia 2008  2007 2004 2008
Turkey 2007  2006 2008 2007
Ukraine 2007 2006 2008 2007
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TABLE A4: CRIME AND GENDER - COUNTRY AVERAGES 
 
Country % of  Losses Due to Crime Over Sales 
% of Firms With at Least 
One female Owner 
% of Firms With at Least One 
Female Owner and Manager 
Argentina 0.63 29.98 5.31 
Azerbaijan 0.20 13.28 3.26 
Belarus 0.72 51.04 22.82 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.44 38.62 10.48 
Costa Rica 0.54 36.31 9.96 
Czech Republic 0.48 30.92 11.71 
Ecuador 1.11 29.30 10.14 
El Salvador 1.73 41.49 10.15 
Estonia 1.69 41.22 20.41 
Fyr Macedonia 0.50 41.09 15.45 
Hungary 0.25 42.34 10.95 
Kazakhstan 0.60 32.30 19.15 
Latvia 0.42 50.21 28.63 
Lithuania 0.43 39.04 13.55 
Moldova 0.54 55.33 17.16 
Mongolia 0.52 54.80 36.16 
Nepal 0.87 32.43 7.08 
Nicaragua 1.68 50.00 24.44 
Paraguay 1.54 47.20 13.57 
Peru 0.64 26.97 8.89 
Philippines 1.32 65.68 24.94 
Poland 0.45 47.72 26.68 
Romania 0.36 46.89 16.18 
Slovak Republic 0.64 31.02 13.89 
Slovenia 0.26 47.10 14.29 
Turkey 0.38 44.67 7.39 
Ukraine 0.45 46.73 23.49 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
TABLE A5: ROBUSTNESS – ADDED CONTROLS  
 
Coefficient of Female Owner Dummy Variable Adjusted R Squared 
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BASE 0.1181* 
 
0.01 
[0.0632]  
  
Fractionalization 
Ethnic 
0.1119* 0.01
[0.0614]  
  
Employees and Security 
Total Employees, Security Costs as 
a % of sales 
0.1145* 0.01
[0.0654]  
  
Corruption and Voter Turnout 
Corruption (Transparency 
International), Voter Turnout 
(IDEA) 
0.1232* 0.01
[0.0635]  
  
Population and Demographics 
Proportion of Female Population, 
Percentage of Population in Urban 
Agglomerates, Population Density, 
Proportion of Population between 
15 and 64 
0.1557* 0.01
[0.0754]  
  
Government Spending and 
Investment 
Government Consumption & 
Total Investment over GDP 
0.1137* 0.01
[0.0622]  
  
Prison Capacity 
Adult Prison Capacity 
0.1309** 0.01
[0.0626]  
 
 
 
TABLE A6: ROBUSTNESS – EXTREME OBSERVATION DOMINANCE  
Coefficient of Female Owner Dummy 
Variable 
Dropping Extreme Crime Loss Observations 
Bottom 1% 0.117* 
[0.063]
Top 1% 0.155* 
[0.081]
Top and Bottom 1% 0.155* 
[0.082]
 
